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This paper demonstrates how stated-preference methods can be applied to modeling consumers’ preferences in the 
field of mobile telecommunications, and to measuring and the valuation of network effects. We illustrate this with a 
case study of mobile phone operators in Poland. We utilize the Choice Experiment method and present the 
respondents with hypothetical choices of mobile phone operators, while explicitly controlling for network effects in 
the form of other users in the same network. Based on the hypothetical choices consumers make we construct a 
conditional random parameters multinomial logit model to analyze their preferences. This approach allows us to 
calculate welfare effects associated with alternatives, as well as marginal rates of substitution (and hence implicit 
prices) of the attributes used to describe the choices, such as operator brand and distribution of family and friends 
between available mobile networks. The latter constitutes a network effect as consumer’s utility is influenced by the 
number (or ratio) of members of his or her family, friends and other users subscribed to the same operator. Our 
results confirm the existence of a strong network effect, which is related to the size of the social network group a 
particular subscriber belongs to, rather than the absolute size of the mobile operator’s customer base. We observe 
that there are two sources of this ‘gross’ network effect – pecuniary (arising from possible price discounts for on-net 
calls) and non-pecuniary, and demonstrate a way to disaggregate them. In addition, we find that brand perception 
and brand loyalty are important determinants of operator choice. Finally, through the application of a non-market 
valuation method we are able to calculate monetary values of the network effect and brand loyalty, and both turn out 
to be relatively high. The results might be of a particular interest to mobile phone operators and regulatory 
authorities – we find that the capacity for vigorous price competition between mobile operators is limited due to 
significant non-price barriers which mitigate subscribers’ mobility in the market. We demonstrate a way to measure 
these effects in monetary terms based on modeling of consumer preferences.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Telecommunications markets are relatively complicated from the economic analysis point of 
view. There are at least four distinct factors that need to be considered in regulatory and 
competition  models  of  mobile  and  fixed-line  telephone  markets.  These  are:  (i)  non-linear 
pricing in the form of incentive compatible multi-part tariffs, (ii) network effects, (iii) two-
sided markets with wholesale level  regulation,  and (iv)  consumer switching costs.  In this 
study we focus on empirical evaluation of network effects. 
Economides  (1996)  argues  that  telecommunications  is  a  classic  example  of  a  two-way 
network with horizontal compatibility between termination nodes (subscribers). Theoretical 
literature  suggests  that  in  such  markets  the  value  of  a  network  access  increases  with  the 
number  of  subscribers,  constituting  a  direct  network  effect.  In  contrast,  in  markets  with 
vertical compatibility (e.g. between various components of a hardware-software systems, such 
as  personal  computer  or  a  game  console;  Farrell  and  Saloner,  1985;  Katz  and  Shapiro, 
1985)the consumer’s valuation of a  good is positively but indirectly,  rather than directly, 
affected by the total number of other users. For instance, hardware users may be influenced by 
the supply-side economies of scale in software components.
4 This type of externality is a 
market-mediated indirect network effect. We reference the reader to Farrell et al. (2007) for a 
comprehensive review of network effects. 
There have been a large number of empirical studies which attempted to identify direct and 
indirect network effects in various markets. Examples include mainframes (Greenstein, 1993), 
CD  and  DVD  players  (Dranove  and  Gandal,  2003;  Gandal  et  al.,  2000),  spreadsheets 
(Brynjolfsson  and  Kemerer,  1996;  Gandal,  1994),  and  ATMs  (Knittel  and  Stango,  2004, 
2006; Saloner and Shepard, 1995). 
Much effort has also been devoted to study network effects in telecommunications. Most 
notably Liikanen et al. (2004) found positive direct network effects between analogue and 
digital generations of mobile phones as well as within their 2G generation. Doganoglu and 
Grzybowski(2004)  as  well  as  Grajek(2007)  found  evidence  of  a  very  low  economic 
compatibility  between  different  GSM  networks,  which  indicates  the  presence  of  strong 
network effects on the operator level in mobile telephony. They also find that the degree of 
incompatibility increases with the price discounts for on-net calls. The scale and scope of this 
impact may depend on many market- and user-specific factors, such as technology, on-net 
price discounts, the structure of subscriber usage profile, network distribution of their most 
frequently called parties and many others. 
Birke and Swan (2005), and Kim and Kwon (2003) conducted conditional logit analysis on 
consumer survey data and found a strong relationship between the individual valuation of the 
                                                 
4  E.g.  the  more  people  buy  PS2  game  consoles  (hardware),  the  more  variety  of  games  (software)  will  be 
available in the market at reasonable prices.  
 
operator service and the number of its subscribers. This effect is reinforced by the level of on-
net discounts; however, it seems not to be driven solely by price differences. Kim and Kwon 
(2003) found that network effect is positively related to the total size of the mobile operator’s 
network. They argue that the network effects can be rationalized either be quality signaling or 
by price discounts for on-net calls. Unfortunately, they do not explicitly verify this hypothesis 
in their model, since they do not control for price differences between on-net and off-net calls. 
Birke and Swan (2005) go a step further – they examine the network effect while introducing 
interaction of price and network size into their model. They find evidence of ‘pure’ network 
effect – independent from on-net price discounts. Finally, research by Fu (2004) suggests that 
in  the  presence  of  on-net  price  discounts  and  large  disproportions  of  network  sizes,  a 
bandwagon effect is observed. The large networks take over a much larger share of new sign-
ups, leading to even greater marginalization of smaller operators. 
Similar results, under a different methodological approach, were described by Grajek(2007). 
He estimated a diffusion model using a panel data of the Polish mobile telephony market and 
found strong network effects leading to an upward sloping demand. His results indicate that 
network  effects  are  in  part  price-driven,  however,  even  under  flat  on-  and  off-net 
priceconditions, consumers still perceive networks to a large extent incompatible. As a result 
consumers prefer their own network to any other. This indicates that network effects might 
also arise due to learning spillovers and bandwagon effect. Interestingly, Grajek also tested 
for non-linearity of network effects and found that they exhibit decreasing marginal effects.   
Another interesting area of research is the perception of operator brand and its influence on 
consumer choices. Kim and Kwon (2003) find that the choice of a network is partly affected 
by an operator’s brand.
5Birke and Swan (2005) provideevidence that the choice of a particular 
network operator depends on the choices made by the consumer’s household members, and 
on choices the consumer made in the past. This result indicates the brand loyalty effect. In 
summary, the operators’ brands seem to affect utility, and thus consumer choices. As a result, 
operators  seem  to  be  perceived  as  being  differentiated  even  though  they  sell  functionally 
identical services or the differences are controlled for. It seems interesting to investigate to 
what extent this effect can influence choices and possibly add to switching costs.  
The previous studies focusing on modeling network effects in telecommunications markets 
utilized  at  least  three  different  modeling  approaches  –  the  hedonic  price  method,  e.g. 
Gandal(1994), Brynjolfsson et al. (1996), Knittel et al. (2004), modeling of diffusion, e.g. 
Grajek(2007),  Liikanen  et  al.  (2004),  Fu  (2004)  or  conditional  multinomial  logit  model 
applied to revealed preference data, e.g. Birke and Swan (2005), Kim and Kwon(2003). The 
last  approach  seems  to  be  the  most  advantageous  and  reliable,  as  it  utilizes  data  on  the 
individual  level  and  allows  for  direct  modeling  of  utility  functions.  However,  utilizing 
revealed preference data does not always allow for the separation of the network effect from 
the influence of other drivers of consumers’ choices, such as switching costs and other biases.  
                                                 
5 In their case the effect has been significantly negative for the incumbent (the largest) operator.  
 
We propose a different  approach which allows  to directly model  consumers’ preferences, 
based on hypothetical choices they make if presented with properly prepared alternatives. The 
application of this stated-preference method is currently a fast-growing technique which is 
applied in a broad range of fields, including economics of transportation, environment, health, 
marketing, and policy. It makes possible the eliciting of consumer preferences among new 
goods,  or  existing  goods  with  new  attributes,  which  are  not  necessarily  available  on  the 
market or for which market data is missing. The great advantage of this method is the ability 
to systematically and simultaneously study the influence of multiple factors that influence 
choice behavior. It also offers an advantage in that it was developed to allow for explicitly 
modeling  the  importance  of  multiple  experimental  factors  (choice  attributes),  while 
controlling all other factors relevant for consumers’ choices (see e.g. Bateman et al., 2004). 
Our approach enables the formal modeling of utility functions of the consumer, and thus the 
modeling of network effects while controlling all possible biases inevitably present in market 
data.  
The aim of our study is to propose a new way to identify and measure network effects in 
mobile telecommunications market. Our paper introduces the stated-preference methodology 
and illustrates its potential by estimating the strength and monetary value of a pure network 
effect on a Polish mobile telecommunications market while avoiding pitfalls of earlier studies. 
We  verify  a  modified  version  of  existence  hypothesis  –  we  find  that  the  network  effect 
depends not on the absolute size of the operator’s customer base, but rather on the presence of 
family members and friends. Stated-preference methods enable the direct control of how the 
presence of different groups of subscribers in the same network influences consumer choice. 
Moreover, we explicitly test the independence  hypothesis which indicates the presence of 
‘pure’ (non-pecuniary) network effect causing consumers to prefer larger networks even in 
the absence of price discounts.
6 In addition, thanks to the stated preference approach we are 
able to test brand (perception) effect in a direct way – by treating the network brand as an 
explanatory variable of consumers’ choices. We find that the operator’s brand affects utility, 
and thus consumer choice. As a result, operators seem to be perceived as being differentiated 
even though they sell functionally identical services. Finally, our approach illustrates how to 
use marginal rates of substitution between different choice attributes to estimate monetary 
values of these attributes. This way we are able to value marginal network effect and estimate 
the relative values of operators’ brands. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the stated 
preference methodology for conducting choice-experiments. In section 3 we briefly describe 
the structure of mobile phone market in Poland and the empirical study.  In section 4 we 
provide models specification and estimation results. The last section provides discussion and 
conclusions. 
                                                 
6 The independence hypothesis supports the possibility of ‘waterbed effect’ in mobile markets, which illustrates 
the following relation – a reduction or elimination of mobile connection termination fees in the wholesale market 
will likely result in an increase of retail prices Genakos C, Valletti TM 2008. Testing  the 'Waterbed' Effect  in 
Mobile Telephony. CEIS Working Paper No. 110..  
 
 
2.  THE METHOD 
 
Researchers  in  economics  have  two  general  data  sources  for  analyses  of  consumers’ 
preferences  –  revealed  and  stated  preference  data.  The  former  refer  to  situations  where 
people’s choices are observed in real markets and in real market situations. Conversely, stated 
preference data refer to situations where choices are observed in hypothetical situations. One 
of  the  most  prominent  methods  utilizing  stated  preference  data  is  a  choice  experiment  – 
creating  hypothetical  markets,  in  which  consumers  are  faced  with  hypothetical  choices  
(Hanley et al., 1998; Hoyos, 2010; Louviere et al., 2006). Since this approach has (to our best 
knowledge) never been applied in the context of modeling network effects we briefly describe 
the rationale of this method in this section.  
A  choice  experiment  study  can  be  described  as  one  in  which  potential  consumers  make 
choices from mutually exclusive sets of alternatives in a hypothetically constructed scenario.  
In each choice situation, the choice alternatives are described in terms of different levels of 
attributes  associated  with  each  alternative,  and  on  the  basis  of  experimental  design,  the 
alternatives  are  made  to  vary  between  choice  situations.  By  observing  the  changes  in 
respondents’ stated choices with variation in the choice situations, the effects of the attributes 
on the choices can be derived. In essence, this method allows one to estimate parameters of 
utility functions of respondents (i.e. to formally model their preferences) whichenables the 
simulation of their market behavior and welfare changes in case a new product is introduced, 
and to design an optimal mix of attributes that consumers demand.  
Stated  preference  data  are  not  observed  in  real  markets,  but  rather  collected  under  the 
guidance  of  carefully  designed  experiments.  In  the  past  this  raised  questions  concerning 
model validity. Nevertheless, research has shown that such concerns are largely unfounded 
and  the  methods  like  choice  experiment  are  now  considered  mainstream  economics 
(Adamowicz  et  al.,  1998;  Burke  et  al.,  1992;  Carson  et  al.,  1994;  Hanley  et  al.,  1998; 
Loureiro et al., 2003). 
Finally,  the  choices  consumers  make  allow  researchers  not  only  to  estimate  respondents’ 
willingness  to  pay  for  a  single  good  (alternative)  but  also  to  estimate  implicit  prices  – 
respondent’s willingness to pay for each level of each attribute, and the ratios at which they 
are willing to substitute one attribute level for another. 
 
2.1.  MODELING DISCRETE CHOICE DATA 
 
2.1.1.  RANDOM UTILITY MODEL 
 
The modeling of discrete choice data is built on random utility theory developed most notably 
by McFadden (1986). It assumes that the utility associated with any state (choice) can be  
 
divided into a sum of contributions that can be observed by a researcher, and a component 
that  cannot,  and  hence  is  assumed  random.  Building  on  Lancaster’s  theory  of  consumer 
choice (Lancaster, 1966), the observed part of utility of a choice alternative is defined as a 
function of its attributes. This formulation of utility function and choice-specific alternatives 
leads to the conditional multinomial logit model that allows using observed choices of an 
individual to compare their utility levels associated with the choice alternatives.  
Formalizing, let individual i choose among  J  alternatives, each characterized by a vector of 
observed attributes  ij x . The utility associated with alternative  j is given by: 
  ( ) i ij ij ij U Alternative j U e ¢ = = = + βx   (1) 
whereβ is a parameter vector of marginal utilities of the attributes.  
It is assumed that individuals act rationally by evaluating all choice alternatives and choose 
the one from which they derive the greatest utility. By introducing the error term  ij e  the 
modeler assumes utility levels to be random variables, as it is otherwise impossible to explain 
why apparently equal individuals (equal in all attributes which can be observed) may choose 
different options.  
Random  utility  theory  is  transformed  into  different  classes  of  choice  models  by  making 
different  assumptions  about  the  random  term  ij e .  When  it  is  usefully  assumed  to  be 
distributed independently and identically (iid) across individuals and alternatives – Extreme 
Value Type 1 distribution – the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) is derived. In this case, the 
probability that alternative  j is chosen from a set of  J  alternatives that are available for 
individual  i can be expressed as  ( ) ( ) | ij j ik k P j J P e e ¢ ¢ = + > + β x β x  for all  k J Î , such that 
k j ¹ . This leads to the following convenient probability specification: 

















.  (2) 
The  MNL  formulation  is  usually  a  starting  point  for  most  choice  experiment  modeling 
applications,  however,  it  has  some  important  limitations.  These  arise  mainly  from  rigid 
assumptions about the distribution of the error term (a diagonal covariance matrix with equal 
variances)  and  may  result  in  violation  of  assumptions  by  observed  choices  (e.g.  through 
observed correlation of utilities associated with different alternatives; Hensher et al., 2005; 
Louviere  et  al.,  2006).  Another  limitation  of  the  model  is  preference  homogeneity  –  the 
assumption that each individual has the same vector of parameters in their utility functions. 
We will demonstrate below how these limitations can be overcome by relaxing some of the 





2.1.2.  PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY 
 
There have been many attempts to allow for some degree of correlation between alternatives 
and each of the individual’s choices. In particular, these approaches proposed to introduce 
heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences (the fact that consumers have different tastes and 
hence they may perceive and value the attributes of a good) in different ways. Currently 
statistical methods to model the heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences are being rapidly 
developed  in  the  literature  of  choice  modeling  (e.g.  Colombo  et  al.,  2007;  Greene  and 
Hensher, 2007; Hole, 2007; Hynes  et al., 2008). The state-of-the-art  ways to account for 
preference  heterogeneity  consist  in  including  socio-economic  interactions  into  conditional 
multinomial  logit  models  (Brock  and  Durlauf,  2007),  applying  covariance  heterogeneity 
nested models (Koppelman and Sethi, 2005), latent class models (Morey et al., 2006), and 
most notably random parameters conditional models (Hensher and Greene, 2003; McFadden 
and  Train,  2000).  The  random  parameters  conditional  multinomial  logit  model  (RPL)  is 
currently the most flexible and general approach to model preference heterogeneity. Below 
we present its general structure.  
The random utility expression of an individual’s utility function in RPL can be done in the 
following way: 
  itj i itj itj itj itj U e ¢ = + + β x   Y .  (3) 
Note that  i β  is now a vector of individual-specific parameters of marginal utilities of the 
attributes.  Therefore,  we  explicitly  account  for  each  individual  i’s  choices  in  T   choice 
situations.
7  In  addition,  let  itj Y   be  a  vector  of  loadings  that  map  the  error  component 
according to the desired structure (and hence allow for generic correlations), and  itj Ω  be a 
vector of stochastic components which follow a distribution specified by a modeler, with zero 
mean and unknown variance. This new specification of the random term of the utility function 
allows  to  include  numerous  error  structures,  and  hence  to  account  for  heteroscedascity, 
correlation, cross-correlation, and autoregression of error components (Greene and Hensher, 
2007; Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 2003). 
With some loss of generality (assuming that utility function parameters are individual-specific 
but constant across choice situations)
8, the general random utility model can be expressed in a 
more concise form: 
  itj i itj itj U w ¢ = + β x ,  (4) 
where  itj itj itj itj w e = + Ω Y . This model is often called random parameters model because utility 
function  parameters  are  assumed  to  be  random  variables  following  a  certain  distribution 
                                                 
7 In choice experiments an individual is usually confronted with numerous choice-situations whichallows to 
extract more information from each respondent of the study.   
8 In case choice situations were significantly spread in time, or learning effects were allowed for, this assumption 
may be relaxed.    
 
specified by the analyst,  so that  ( ) , i f β b Σ ￿ , where b is a vector of population means of the 
parameters, and Σ is their variance-covariance matrix over the population. Thus, even though 
each individual has a fixed set of utility function parameters, these parameters are allowed to 
follow a certain frequency distribution over the population.
9 Finally, an additional extension 
of the model allows the distributions of the random parameters to be heterogeneous with 
observed  data  i z   –  a  set  of  choice  invariant  characteristics  that  result  in  individual 
heterogeneity. This allows for introducing heterogeneity in both means of the parameters and 
their variances (heteroscedascity). Formally,  ( ) , i i i f + + β b ∆z Σ Γz ￿  where  ∆ and  Γ are 
vectors of separately estimated parameters that enter the heterogeneous means and variances 
of the random parameters.  
 
2.1.3.  ESTIMATION 
 
In  a  classical  approach  a  model  is  estimated  via  simulated  maximum-likelihood  methods 
(Bhat, 2001; Train, 2003). Let individual  i’s choices in  T  choice situations be denoted by 
( ) 1,..., i i iT y y = y ,  where  it y j =   if  itj itk U U > ,  for  all  j k ¹ .  The  conditional  probability  of 
observing  an  individual  i  stating  a  sequence  i y   of  choices,  given  the  fixed  values  of 
individual-specific  parameters  of  utility  function  i β
10,  is  given  by  the  product  of  logit 
functions: 


















  L =







,  (5) 
where 1 itk d =  if  it y j = , and zero otherwise.  
The unconditional probability of choice is given by the integration of equation (5) weighted 
by the density distribution of  i β  over the choice-study sample:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) | | , i i i i i P f d = L ∫ y y β β b Σ β ,  (6) 
where ( ) f ×  is the multivariate distribution of  i β  over the sampled population. If covariance 
terms are not present, S  is a diagonal matrix.  
The log-likelihood function in band Σ is given by: 
                                                 
9 The most frequently used continuous distributions are normal, log-normal, uniform, and triangular. Discrete 
distributions are also possible – they lead to the latent class model, in which distinct latent groups of individuals 
have the same utility function parameters. 
10 In MNL model all consumers have the same parameters of their utility function; hence the  i index can be 
skipped. This is not the case when preference heterogeneity is allowed for, see section 2.1.2 for details.   
 








=∑ y .  (7) 
Since the probability  ( ) i P y  does not have a closed-form solution it is approximated through 
simulation  ( ) ( ) i sP y  – draws
11 are taken from the mixing distribution  ( ) f ×  weighted by the 
logit probability, and averaged up (McFadden and Train, 2000). Hence, the simulated log-
likelihood function becomes: 






s L sP y
=
=∑ b Σ .  (8) 
This  allows  a  researcher  to  arrive  at  maximum-likelihood  estimators  for  band  Σ,  which 
define a distribution of utility function parameters over the population.  
 
2.1.4.  WELFARE MEASURES 
 
A consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a marginal change in one of the attributes can be 
computed as marginal rate of substitution between the quantity expressed by the attribute, and 
income, at a constant utility level (Meijer and Rouwendal, 2006). The concept is equivalent to 
computing  the  compensating  variation,  as  applications  usually  deal  with  a  linear 
approximation of indirect utility function (Small and Rosen, 1981). Therefore, point estimates 
of marginal rate of substitution represent the slope of the utility function for the range where 
this approximation holds.  
In  choice  experiments,  as  income  is  often  missing  from  the  indirect  utility  function,  the 
marginal rate of substitution is calculated with respect to minus the cost variable, which is 
usually  included  as  one  of  the  attributes  characterizing  alternatives  (Jara-Díaz,  1991). 
Therefore, for a linear utility function, the WTP for a certain level of attribute equals the ratio 
between the parameter of interest and the minus cost attribute. 
A non-trivial problem arises in case both variables are random, and often correlated, as their 
ratio has an unknown, and possibly bi-modal distribution (Pham-Gia et al., 2006). There is an 
ongoing research in this field and several solutions to this problem have been proposed (e.g. 
Hensher and Greene, 2003; Hu et al., 2005; Sillano and Ortúzar, 2005; Train and Weeks, 
2005). As the main moments of WTP distributions may not exist (Daly et al., 2010) one can 
always turn to estimating median WTPs.  
 
 
                                                 
11 It is usual to use apply quasi-random sampling, e.g. Halton draws, to reduce the simulation variance and to 
improve the efficiency of the estimation Bhat CR. Quasi-random maximum simulated likelihood estimation of 
the mixed multinomial logit model. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 2001;35; 677-693, Hensher 
D, Greene W. The Mixed Logit model: The state of practice. Transportation 2003;30; 133-176..  
 
 
2.2.  DESIGNING CHOICE EXPERIMENTS 
 
There  are  numerous  ways  in  which  attribute-combinations  and  alternatives  for  choice-
situations can be prepared. As there are often too many attributes (and their possible levels) to 
include all possible combinations in a single choice experiment, a so-called fractional factorial 
design can be used. It consists in including only some combinations of attribute levels in 
alternatives, usually imposing attribute levels orthogonality and balance (Street and Burgess, 
2007; Street et al., 2005). 
More recently is has been shown that it is possible to construct non-orthogonal designs which 
allow for extracting more information from respondents’ choices (Sándor and Wedel, 2001). 
This  led  to  the  development  of  so-called  efficient  designs  for  choice  experiments,  which 
instead of preparing orthogonal sets of attributes for each choice-set that is presented to a 
respondent  in  a  choice  experiment,  designs  choice-sets  in  a  way  which  minimizes  the 
determinant of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the parameters (D-error), given 
the priors of the parameters of a representative respondent’s utility function (Scarpa and Rose, 
2008).  
Since  the  parameters  are  usually  not  all  equal  to  0,  orthogonal  factorial  designs  are  not 
efficient. Researchers usually have some idea of what the priors could be
12which allows the 
preparation of choice experiments that reveal more information, and hence improve statistical 
properties of the final model, or enable the sample to be decreased, which is required for 
model estimation, and thus reducing the cost of a study. 
Finally,  the  state-of-the-art  choice  experiments  utilize  Bayesian  efficient  designs.  This 
consists of utilizing priors which are random variables, rather than fixed coefficients (Sándor 
and  Wedel,  2001).  In  this  case  computation  of  efficient  design  requires  simulation-based 
integration, as the equation of D-error cannot be solved analytically.  The added value of this 
approach is accounting for uncertainty with respect to parameters’ priors, by allowing these 
priors to be random variables following a probability distribution over a range of plausible 
values. 
After  describing  the  methodology  of  choice  experiments,  allowing  to  formally  model 
consumer’s preferences based on the hypothetical choices they make in controlled conditions, 
we  now  turn  to  demonstrating  how  this  approach  can  be  used  for  the  measurement  and 




                                                 
12 It is also common practice to conduct pilot studies which are used for generating priors for the design of a 
main study.  
 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The Polish mobile telecommunications market is now at maturity, with sim-card penetration 
at around 110%. There are three incumbent GSM operators and one new entrant operating on 
the  market.  The  incumbent  companies  have  almost  equal  market  shares  and  collectively 
control 95% of the market. Since 2002 these operators have been offering 3G services under 
similar network coverage.
13 In 2005 UKE (the Polish equivalent of NRA) granted the fourth 
UMTS license to a new entrant – Play Mobile (P4). Play started its 2G operations in 2007 
under national roaming agreement with Plus and 3G services in its own UMTS network. Now 
P4 has 5% market share in voice services. NRA secured P4 with asymmetric MTR rates. The 
current level of asymmetry is around 126% but originally it was more than 200%. There are 
numerous virtual mobile network operators (MVNOs) in the Polish market, however their 
importance is negligible. 
We aimed to model the factors that influence consumers’ choices of mobile phone services’ 
providers, based on stated preference study. Such data is usually collected in the form of a 
survey which is distributed among a sample of target population. A choice experiment survey 
typically collects socio-demographic data, introduces the choice tasks that are about to follow, 
and presents each respondent with hypothetical situations, each time asking to indicate the 
most preferred alternative. In addition, a questionnaire contains mechanisms and information 
that  are  included  in  order  to  mitigate  biases  that  might  be  present  in  hypothetical  choice 
situations (for a comprehensive review of potential biases and ways to mitigate them see e.g. 
Bateman et al., 2004; Carson et al., 2001).  
 
3.1.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
In  order  to  examine  potential  factors  influencing  the  choice  of  mobile  providers  (i.e.  the 
choice  attributes),  initial  qualitative  research  was  conducted.  We  applied  focus  group 
interviews to reduce the number of possible choice attributes to a manageable number of five 
which consumers paid the most attention to, when choosing their mobile phone’s operator. 
The  first  of  the  attributes  used  in  the  study  was  a  brand  name  of  the  mobile  operator’s 
network. In our preliminary interviews respondents seemed to associate various qualities with 
different  operators  (brands).  For  this  reason  we  have  included  the  four  brands  of 
                                                 
13 These are: PTK Centertel (Orange), PTC (Era) and Polkomtel (Plus). PTK Centertel is a subsidiary of Polish 
Telecom Group – a former monopolist. It was the first mobile operator in Poland. In 1991 PTK launched 1G 
telephony under NMT-450i and GSM telephony in 1998. PTC is a full subsidiary of T-mobile. Polkomtel is 
owned by Vodafone and a number of huge Polish state-owned companies. Both companies started to offer GSM 
services in 1996.  
 
infrastructural MNOs currently operating on the Polish market: Orange, Era, Plus and Play. 
Virtual operators were excluded from the research, due to their negligible market share. 
The next two attributes reflected the price of a call. Operators in Poland do not apply flat 
rates,  but  price-discriminate  based  on  call  destination.
14  Therefore,  we  have  included  two 
price attributes in our study: on-net price per minute and off-net price per minute. Possible 
levels of these attributes, which were used to describe the alternatives used in choice sets 
presented to our respondents, reflected current prices of calls in the market and also levels 
perceived by participants of focus groups. These were 0.10, 0.30, and 0.50 PLN
15 per minute 
for on-net calls and 0.30, 0.50, and 0.70 PLN per minute for off-net calls respectively. 
The aim of our study was to measure the network effects and their influence on consumers’ 
choices. During the interviews it turned out that an essential attribute that has an impact on the 
choice of a mobile operator is the presence of specific other subscribers on the same network. 
However, preliminary qualitative study, as well as some evidence in the literature (Birke and 
Swann,  2005)  indicated  that  what  matters  is  not  the  total  number  of  subscribers  in  the 
network, but rather the number of people who they most often call, such as family members 
and friends. Calls to those groups of people generate the major part of network traffic, so their 
presence on the same network is important for the total cost of calls. 
Our  qualitative  research  with  the  focus  groups  has  shown  that  the  other  people  whose 
presence  is  important  for  selecting  a  mobile  operator  can  be  divided  into  three  exclusive 
groups, depending on each respondent’s individual emotional relation with them. These three 
social circles are: 
-  ‘Family’ – people such as parents, siblings, partners and other people who are not 
necessarily a family but are considered to be ‘the closest’;
16 
-  ‘Friends’  –  all  persons  with  whom  respondent  maintains  regular  contact,  such  as 
friends, acquaintances, and relatives, who were not classified as the ‘family’; 
-  ‘Others’ – all the other people who a respondent contacts irregularly, such as shops, 
offices, distant friends, or does not contact at all, but are still connected to the same 
network. This attribute was basically equivalent to each operator’s customer base. 
As  a  result,  each  of  the  alternatives  (possible  operators)  in  a  choice  situation  has  been 
described by the three additional attributes, associated with the percentage of people who they 
consider their ‘family’,  ‘friends’ and ‘others’ who would also be subscribers of the same 
operator. The first two of these attributes could take the levels of 25%, 50%, and 75%, while 
the proportion of ‘others’ in the same network could be 20%, 30%, and 40%.  
                                                 
14 This is to some extent justified by the substantial level of mobile termination rates, which cause calls on the 
same network to cost less than off-the-network calls. 
15 1 PLN ≈ 0.25 EUR ≈ 0.3 USD 
16 It is important, and was clearly explained in the questionnaire, that the ‘family’ group does not necessarily 
consist of family members only, but rather whoever the respondent considers to be ‘the closest’. Similarly, some 
family members could be classified by the respondents to the ‘friends’ group, if they contacted them less often 
than other members of ‘the closest’ group.   
 
The full list of attributes and their possible levels used in the study is summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The list of attributes used to describe choice alternatives, and their levels 
Brand of the operator 
·  Orange 
·  Era 
·  Plus 
·  Play 
On-net price (PLN per minute) 
·  0.10 
·  0.30 
·  0.50 
Off-net price (PLN per minute) 
·  0.30 
·  0.50 
·  0.70 
% of ‘family’ using the same operator  
·  25% 
·  50% 
·  75% 
% of ‘friends’ using the same operator 
·  25% 
·  50% 
·  75% 
% of ‘others’ using the same operator 
·  20% 
·  30% 
·  40% 
 
The  survey  was  structured  as  follows.  In  the  beginning  the  purpose  of  the  survey  was 
explained and we assured anonymity of each respondent’s individual answers. Then questions 
referring to the current use of a mobile phone followed – type of contract, current mobile 
operator, and calling profile such as volume of generated traffic and the average monthly bill. 
In the next part of the questionnaire we introduced the choice tasks to follow – we described 
the attributes and their possible levels. We clearly defined the groups of ‘family’, ‘friends’ 
and ‘others’ in the survey. Finally, the choice tasks followed. For each choice situation a 
respondent was asked to choose an alternative he prefers the most, in terms of the attribute 
levels that described it. In the last part of the questionnaire we collected socio-demographic 
data such as age, gender, household size and income of the respondents. 
In  our  study,  each  respondent  was  faced  with  12  choice  tasks,  each  consisting  of  4 
alternatives. Each alternative was described with the 5 attributes, specified above. An example 
of a choice card shown to respondents is given in Figure 1. The choice sets utilized in our 
study were prepared using Bayesian efficient design (see Section 2.2 for details). To obtain 
initial estimates (priors) and to verify the qualitative properties of the questionnaire itself we 












Which of the following mobile phone operators’ offers would you consider the best for yourself? 
 
Operator  ORANGE  ERA  PLUS  PLAY 
On-net price per minute  10 gr  10 gr  50 gr  50 gr 
Off-net price per minute  70 gr  30 gr  70 gr  30 gr 
‘Family’ in the same network  75%  25%  25%  75% 
‘Friends’ in the same network  75%  50%  25%  50% 
‘Others’ on the same network  20%  30%  30%  40% 




The final survey was conducted on a sample of 267 students from the Faculty of Economic 
Sciences at University of Warsaw. This resulted in 3204 choice observations. Our sample was 
not representative for any group of mobile users in Poland (other than the students at this 
faculty),  however,  we  use  it  for  the  illustration  of  how  stated  preference  elicitation  and 
modeling techniques can be used for the analysis of network effects. In addition, some of our 
findings remain valid irrespective of the representativeness of the sample. In particular this 
refers  to  confirming  the  presence  of  network  effect  and  analyzing  its  characteristics.  We 
verify these hypotheses in Section 4 below.  
 
3.2.  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
 
We  now  turn  to  reporting  the  basic  characteristics  of  our  sample  data.  Even  though  our 
sample was not representative, some sample characteristics might be useful in interpreting the 
results presented in Section 4.  
The largest number of students in the test group had a mobile phone operated by Orange 
(36%), followed by Era (30%), Plus (24%) and Play (10%). These results differ from the 
overall  Polish  market  shares  but  this  is  expected,  as  the  demand  for  telecommunications 
services  is  highly  differentiated,  and  operators  introduce  strategies  which  target  different 
segments  of  the  market.  The  usage  profile  of  telecommunications  services  in  the  student 
group is characterized by low expenditure on telecommunications and a considerably reduced  
 
volume of outgoing voice traffic. This makes them relatively less attractive to Plus and Era, 
who focus on segments with higher intensity of demand. Students are, however, a natural 
target group for Play who entered the already relatively saturated market, and for Orange, 
who has an attractive all-around offer. 
The usage profile of voice telecommunications services for students is characterized by a 
relatively  low  demand  for  ‘paid  minutes’,  small  expenditures  and  a  high  sensitivity  to 
discounts for on-net calls. Almost 60% of students were subscribers to the postpaid system. 
The mean monthly bill for all telecommunications services (voice, data, SMS, MMS) was less 
than 50 PLN.  
The usage profile of our sample group indicated that the vast majority of calls are established 
with a small group of people belonging to the ‘family’ group (median share of 70%) and a 
slightly wider group of ‘friends’. On average, the ‘family’ group consisted of 6 persons, while 
the average size of the ‘friends’ was 14. We observed the tendency of the members of these 
two social circles to group with the same operator. Half of the sample students reported to 
have had at least 50% of the ‘family’ and 40% of the ‘friends’ use the same operator. Only in 
the case of Play the intra-network sizes of both groups were smaller – 30-40% of the ‘family’ 
and 10-20% of the ‘friends’. 
According to our respondents, the most important factor in selecting an operator are the prices 
for off-net and on-net connections, as well as the share of the ‘family’ subscribed to the same 
operator. 80% of respondents declared these factors to be important or very important. In 
addition, a significant group of respondents (60%) were driven by non-price factors, such as 
operator brand and the presence of ‘fiends’ on the same network. Our preliminary finding is 
that the overall size of the operator’s network was considered irrelevant. This indicates that 
the magnitude of network effect may depend mainly on the size of the group with which a 
respondent maintains close and constant social relations. We verify this finding quantitatively 
in the next section.  
The declared prices of on-net and off-net connections averaged 0.27 and 0.46 respectively. 
The price differentiation between the operators was relatively small. Era was declared by its 
users to be the cheapest, with price per minute of 0.24 and 0.40 PLN, respectively, for on-net 
and off-net calls per minute. Analogous connection prices charged by the other operators were 
perceived to be on average 0.26 and 0.47 PLN (Plus), 0.28 and 0.48 PLN (Orange) and 0.32 
and 0.44 PLN (Play). Compared to the ‘big three’, Play represents a pricing strategy of a ‘late 
entrant’  who  has  to  build  its  customer  base  by  taking  over  subscribers  from  mature 
competitors. For this strategy to be successful, Play has to compensate for negative network 










The  stated  preference  choice  data  was  used  to  formally  model  consumers’  preferences. 
Several model specifications were used. For illustration, we start with presenting the simplest 
– the multinomial logit model.  
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,  (9) 
where : 
-  ORA, ERA and  PLU  are dummy variables representing alternative specific constants 
associated with each operator (Play is assumed the reference point). These variables 
control for properties of the operators, such as quality of service, brand perception etc., 
not controlled for by other attributes of presented alternatives; 
-  ON P  and  OFF P  represent on-net and off-net price respectively; 
-  FAM , FRI  and OTH  represent the percentage of people from the ‘family’, ‘friends’, 
and ‘others’ respectively, subscribed to the same operator; 
-  b are parameters associated with respective variables.  
 
4.1.  THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
 
The results of the MNL model are given in Table 2. We begin by noting that almost all 
explanatory  variables  turn  out  to  be  significant  determinants  of  choice.  Although  the 
parameter values do not have direct interpretation, their signs and relative values reflect how 
different factors influence respondents’ choices (their utility, and hence the probability of 
choosing a certain alternative).  
Coefficients of alternative-specific constants (ORA,  ERA,  PLU ) indicate that respondents 
prefer to subscribe to one of the ‘big three’ networks rather than to Play, ceteris paribus. 
Their relative values indicate that Orange is the most preferred, followed by Era and Plus.  
The coefficient of on-net price per minute is not statistically significant. This is likely a result 
of  ON P  entering the model through interactions withFAM ,FRI , and OTH  at the same time, 
hence the effect of a higher on-net price is already controlled for by these interactions. The  
 
coefficient  of  off-net  price  is  significant  and  negative,  as  are  two  of  the  interaction 
coefficients.  This  indicates  the  negative  influence  of  price  on  utility,  and  hence  on  the 
probability of choosing an alternative with higher prices. The interpretation of interaction 
terms is this – the more ‘family’ or ‘friends’ on-net and the higher the on-net price (at the 
same time), the lower the utility is.  
The coefficients associated with the percentage of people from the ‘family’, ‘friends’, and 
‘others’ groups indicate their influence on choice probabilities. Clearly, the percentage of the 
members  of  the  ‘family’  group  is  the  most  significant  determinant  of  choice,  with  the 
coefficient  for  the  ‘friends’  over  two  times  smaller.  The  coefficient  associated  with  the 
percentage of ‘others’ in the same network is not significant what indicates that the market 
share of an operator is not an important determinant of consumers’ choice – which matters is 
the presence of people with whom close relations are maintained.  
 
Table  2 – The results of the multinomial logit model 
  Coefficient  Standard error 
ORA b  – services operated by Orange  0.7673***  0.0751 
ERA b  – services operated by Era  0.6541***  0.0948 
PLU b  – services operated by Plus  0.4992***  0.0834 
ON P  – on-net price  2.1452  1.2744 
OFF P  – off-net price  –4.6035***  0.1801 
FAM   –  %  of  ‘family’  using  the  same 
operator 
4.3185***  0.4711 
FRI   –  %  of  ‘friends’  using  the  same 
operator 
2.1704***  0.3479 
OTH   –  %  of  ‘others’  using  the  same 
operator 
0.9170  0.8340 
ON P FAM b – interaction of on-net price and 
% of ‘family’ using the same operator 
–7.6874***  1.6952 
ON P FRI b – interaction of on-net price and 
% of ‘friends’ using the same operator 
–6.1711***  1.3581 
ON P OTH b – interaction of on-net price and 
% of ‘others’ using the same operator 
–1.8476  3.1794 
  Log likelihood function  
Pseudo-R
2 
AIC (normalized)  





***, **, * – Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
  
 
The  above  simple  model  was  used  to  illustrate  how  the  results  can  be  interpreted.  It  is 
interesting to briefly summarize some of these first results, however. We observe the presence 
of a strong network effect – the presence of the people a respondent maintains close social 
relations with (‘family’, ‘friends’) significantly increases the attractiveness of an offer. This 
effect is irrespective of the potential cost savings, since their interactions with the on-net price 
are controlled for. Therefore, what we observe is a ‘pure’ (non-pecuniary) network effect. In 
contrast, the presence of ‘others’ in the same network does not influence respondents’ choices 
in a significant, systematic way. 
 
4.2.  THE RANDOM PARAMETERS LOGIT MODEL 
 
In the next step we relax some of rigid assumptions of the MNL model. We have tested 
several model specifications allowing for the incorporation of preference heterogeneity. The 
best  performing  model,  both  in  terms  of  goodness-of-fit  indices  (Akaike  and  Bayesian 
Information Criteria) as well as its predictive power, was a random parameters multinomial 
logit model in which all the attributes’ parameters were assumed to be normally distributed 
random  variables.  We  allowed  for  correlations  between  these  random  parameters,  which 
proved  to  be  highly  significant.  In  addition,  we  accounted  for  the  panel  structure  of  our 
dataset (since each respondent faced 12 choice-sets) by introducing random effects type of 
treatment – additional random term for all observations from the same individual. Finally, we 
introduced observed individual heterogeneity in alternative specific constants (ORA,  ERA, 
PLU ). The means of these random parameters’ distributions were assumed to be functions of 
individual-specific  explanatory  variables
17  –  the  brand  of  currently  subscribed  operator 
( ORA SQ ,  ERA SQ ,  PLU SQ ).  
Table 3 shows the results for our final, random parameters logit model.
18 The introduction of 
individual  heterogeneity  and  a  more  complex  error  structure  drastically  increases  model 
performance. This is visible as the large increase in the values of log-likelihood function, and 
pseudo-R
2, with a decrease of AIC and BIC indices, in comparison with the MNL model.  
We  start  the  analysis  with  the  panel  B  of  Table  3.  The  statistical  significance  of  all  the 
coefficients  indicates  that  standard  deviations  of  the  random  parameters  are  significantly 
different from zero, and hence that the variables should indeed be modeled as random. This is 




                                                 
17 As reported by a respondent. 
18 Should the reader be interested in inspecting the correlation between the parameters, we report the estimates of 
the elements of lower triangular of Cholesky matrix (i.e. products of Cholesky decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix of coefficients) in Annex 1.  
 
Table 3. The results of the random parameters model 
  (A) Means of normally distributed 
random parameters 
(B) Standard deviations of normally 
distributed random parameters 
  Coefficient  Standard error  Coefficient  Standard error 
ORA b   –  services  operated  by 
Orange 
0.8451***  0.1446  0.9806***  0.1411 
ERA b  – services operated by Era  0.4053**  0.1631  0.8078***  0.1498 
PLU b  – services operated by Plus  0.2045  0.1487  0.4654***  0.1308 
ON P  – on-net price  0.6590  2.5626  4.9151**  2.2560 
OFF P  – off-net price  –8.3644***  0.4948  6.5545***  0.4468 
FAM  – % of ‘family’ using the 
same operator 
6.3468***  0.8340  6.1437***  0.6458 
FRI  – % of ‘friends’ using the 
same operator 
4.1570***  0.6794  4.7318***  0.5058 
OTH  – % of ‘others’ using the 
same operator 
0.2320  1.5389  4.8208***  1.2196 
ON P FAM b –  interaction  of  on-net 
price and % of ‘family’ using the 
same operator 
–11.2236***  2.5238  12.7225***  2.1544 
ON P FRI b –  interaction  of  on-net 
price and % of ‘friends’ using the 
same operator 
–8.8433***  2.7947  11.3908***  1.9729 
ON P OTH b –  interaction  of  on-net 
price and % of ‘others’ using the 
same operator 
–2.7651  5.9869  19.2064***  4.4508 
(C) Covariates of means of random parameters 
ORA SQ –  currently  subscribed  to 
Orange (covariate of ORA b ) 
0.71067***  0.18641  –  – 
ERA SQ –  currently  subscribed  to 
Era (covariate of  ERA b ) 
0.77649***  0.18049  –  – 
PLU SQ –  currently  subscribed  to 
Plus (covariate of PLU b ) 
1.14241***  0.17862  –  – 









***, **, * – Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
 
Interpreting  the  coefficients  given  in  panel  A  should  now  be  done  together  with  the 
coefficients in panel C – covariates of means of normally distributed random parameters. 
They all have expected signs and relative values, and their interpretation coincides with that 
given to the MNL model parameters. The dummy variables associated with the brand of 
currently  subscribed  network  ( ORA SQ ,  ERA SQ ,  PLU SQ )  are  very  significant  explanatory  
 
variables of the means of alternative specific constants’ distributions ( ORA b ,  ERA b , and  PLU b  
respectively).  This  is  an  indicator  of  strong  brand  loyalty  –  the  consumers  currently 
subscribed to an operator prefer this operator to others, even in their hypothetical choices, and 
even if the prices and the presence of the ‘family’ and ‘friends’ are controlled for. This effect 
is  the  strongest  for  current  Plus  users,  and  is  similar  for  Era  and  Orange 
( PLU ERA ORA SQ SQ SQ > > , see panel C for details). Once this effect is controlled for, we can 
see that Orange seems to be the brand which is mostly appreciated for its latent characteristics 
(e.g.  quality  of  service),  while  Era  is  almost  twice  less  appreciated  and  Plus  is  not 
significantly different from Play ( ORA ERA PLU b b b > > ) . 
As before, the off-net price has a significant and negative coefficient, as is the on-net price, 
entering through interactions with the ‘family’ and ‘friends’. The market share of an operator 
(‘others’) does not seem to significantly contribute to explaining consumers’ choices, even if 
interacted with on-net price.  
 
4.3.  VALUATION OF NETWORK EFFECTS 
 
We now turn to estimating the monetary value of network effects, i.e. to calculating implicit 
prices of the attributes associated with network effects. This can be done by calculating the 
marginal rate of substitution of monetary parameters – in our case the price of off-net calls – 
for an attribute of interest.  
Panel A of Table 4 shows median implicit prices in terms of average price per minute, along 
with  associated  standard  deviations.  These  were  generated  using  parametric  bootstrapping 
following Krinsky and Robb (1986). Since our price parameter was also random we have 
followed the simulation method similar
19 to that proposed by Hu et al. (2005); in order to 
avoid ‘exploding’ implicit prices, when a random price parameter was very close to zero we 
averaged over 10
4 draws of each parameter, for each round of Krinsky and Robb draws from 
parameter distributions.  
The results in panel A of Table 4 can be interpreted in the following way. The median value 
of Orange and Era brands for the subscribers of these networks, in comparison with Play, is 
an equivalent of a 10.10 and 4.85 cent PLN increase in price per minute, respectively. This is 
a net effect, as we control for the commitment effect – the fact that our participants seemed to 
prefer brands which they were currently using. Additional illustration is provided if the results 
are expressed in terms of additional cost of monthly mobile phone bill. This is done in panel 
B of Table 4. The results show that having a phone in the Orange network, as compared to the 
Play network is worth an additional 17.75 PLN increase of an average monthly bill, all else 
being equal. Similarly, the value of having Era as an operator, in comparison with Play, was 
                                                 
19  Since  our  parameters  were  correlated,  we  took  draws  from  multivariate  normal  distribution,  rather  than 
multiple draws from normal distribution of parameter.   
 
8.52  PLN  a  month.  These  results  show  that  consumers  perceive  mobile  phone  operators 
differently, in spite of the functional similarity of their services. 
 
Table 4.Implicit prices of the choice attributes 
  (A) Increase of price per one minute  
of off-net connection [cPLN] 
(B) Increase of an average monthly bill 
[PLN] 
Attribute  Implicit price  Standard error  Implicit price  Standard error 
ORA b   10.1037***  1.6961  17.754***  2.9804 
ERA b   4.8457**  1.9613  8.5148**  3.4463 
PLU b  
2.4452  1.7854  4.2967  3.1372 
FAM   0.7588***  0.0973  1.3333***  0.1709 
FRI   0.4970***  0.0751  0.8733***  0.1319 
***, **, * – Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
 
Similarly, we were able to calculate implicit prices for the network effects – increasing the 
ratio  of  ‘family’  and  ‘friends’  who  are  using  the  same  network.  Each  percentage  point 
increase of the ‘family’ using the same operator was wortha  0.76 cent PLN increase in the 
price of an off-net minute of call. The equivalent value for ‘friends’ was almost 0.50 cents 
PLN. In terms of an increase of a monthly bill these attributes are equivalent to an additional 
1.33  or  0.87  PLN  respectively.  These  results  demonstrate  the  presence  of  a  very  strong 
network effect – with an increasing quantities of goods (number of close persons using the 
same operator) consumers are willing to pay higher prices per minute or higher bills. Hence, 
the network effect causes a reduction of price elasticity of demand for minutes. This result is 
valid even though savings due to cheaper on-net calls are controlled for, and hence constitutes 
a non-pecuniary network effect.  
The reasons for this ‘pure’ network effect, as proposed by Grajek(2007), and Kim and Kwon 
(2003) are quality signaling and conformist behavior of consumers. Our findings – strong 
network effects in close social groups – are supportive for both explanations, as we usually 
observe conformist behavior in close social group as well as quality or norm signaling via 












5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study we demonstrate the existence of a network effect in the Polish mobile phone 
market. We observe that the choice of an operator is strongly determined by a presence of the 
people a consumer contacts most often, and is in the closest relationships. This result occurs 
even  if  potential  cost  savings,  due  to  lower  on-net  price  per  minute,  are  controlled  for. 
Therefore we conclude that we observe a direct, non-pecuniary network effect. The possible 
reasons for this ‘pure’ network effect are quality or norm signaling and conformist behavior 
of consumers, especially with regard to groups of a small social distance. 
Thanks to utilizing the stated-preference approach we were able to observe that the network 
effect is stronger for the persons a consumer considers to be closer or contacts more often 
(e.g. family members) than for more loose relationships (e.g. friends). We found that this 
effect is far stronger than the size of the total base of an operator’s users (‘others’), which did 
not turn out to significantly contribute to the choice of an operator.  
The presence of a network effect is in line with the findings of Birke and Swan (2005), Fu 
(2004), and Kim and Kwon (2003). However, we show that this effect depends on the number 
of people a consumer calls most often, rather than all subscribers to a network. In addition, 
unlike Birke and Swan (2005) we observe a significant interaction of the on-net price and the 
presence of ‘family’ or ‘friends’ in the same network. We thus conclude that the network 
effect is partly driven by on-net price discounts and partly by non-pecuniary effects, which we 
call the ‘pure’ network effect. We argue that our results are more reliable as they do not suffer 
from other uncontrolled influences, the revealed data may suffer from. These include e.g. the 
switching cost that, as other studies have shown, to large extent determines which operator is 
used (Birke and Swann, 2005; Grajek, 2007).  
We found that consumers displayed relatively strong preconceptions of operators’ quality of 
service.  This  was  manifested  through  the  value  consumers’  placed  on  their  brands, 
irrespective  of  other  attributes  of  choice  which,  thanks  to  utilizing  a  choice  experiment 
technique,  could  be  freely  altered  and  hence  controlled  for.  A  similar  study  targeted  at 
representative  samples  of  other  populations  could  lead  to  the  valuation  of  mobile  phone 
operators’ brands in total.  
Another interesting observation we were able to make was a significant impact of the status-
quo operator on each respondent’s choices. It seems that our respondents displayed a strong 
loyalty to their present operator, even in hypothetical choices. This effect was not symmetrical 
– the loyalty to some operators was stronger than to the others. This interesting auto-selection 
mechanism increases switching costs, despite mobile number portability introduced in recent 
years.  
Our  study  proposes  a  new  way  to  identify  and  measure  network  effects  in  mobile 
telecommunications market. We introduce the relevant methodology and demonstrate its use. 
The stated preference approach allows to freely change relevant attributes’ levels and hence  
 
control for all the factors that might be relevant for consumers’ choices, and avoid biases 
present in revealed (market) data. This bottom-up approach allowed us to formally model 
consumers’ utility functions and therefore measure and provide monetary values of network 
effects, and other factors relevant for mobile operator choices.  
Through  the  utilization  of  random  parameters  multinomial  logit  model  we  were  able  to 
account for preference heterogeneity. This turned out to be a significant improvement in our 
model specification indicating that there is a strong heterogeneity in terms of perception of all 
the major determinants  of operator  choice – brand, on-net and off-net  call price, and the 
presence of other groups of users of the same operator.  
From  the  perspective  of  regulatory  policy  the  independence  of  network  effects  and  price 
effects may bring important conclusions. We provide empirical evidence that the network 
effects may not disappear with the abolition of interconnection rates and introduction of a flat 
(non-differentiated) rates for a call. Therefore, operators can try to discount network effects 
and  brand  commitment  by  increasing  price  of  calls  for  end  users.  In  response  to  such 
behavior, regulatory authorities should seek to further reduce switching costs and enforce high 
standards of service across networks. The explicit modeling of non-pecuniary network effects, 
utilizing proposed methodology, may be of interest to the national equivalents of NRA in each 
country, as they would find it worthy to consider regulatory mechanisms for retail prices 
based on actual costs of services. 
In conclusion, our study lays foundations for future research of network effects. Although we 
have applied the methodology to a non-representative study group, we have demonstrated the 
potential of this method for applications to modeling network effects on other markets, other 
groups of consumers, and for regulatory policy. We also argue that our findings about the 
nature of network effect, brand perception and brand loyalty remain valid for other groups of 
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ANNEX  1.  LOWER  TRIANGULAR  OF  CHOLESKY  MATRIX  FOR  THE  RPL  MODEL  WITH  RANDOM  PRICE 




ORA b   ERA b   PLU b   ON P   OFF P   FAM   FRI   OTH  
ON P FAM b   ON P FRI b   ON P OTH b  
ORA b  
0.9806*** 
(0.1411)  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 
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***, **, * – Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 